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A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT-PARTY RELATIONSHIPS
J. Blondel
In a previous paper, an effort was made to define what is 
meant by party government, by party decision and by supporting 
party in order to establish a base on which to build a model 
designed to examine and ultimately account for types of party 
government (1). The aim of the present paper is to examine these 
types of party government: we shall do so following the approach 
proposed by R.S. Katz, that is to say both in terms of the extent 
to which governments are of a party type of government 
{1 partyness') and in terms of the relative position, so to speak, 
which a given government occupies according to a number of 
possible 'dimensions' of party government (2).
In order to undertake this analysis, however, we must 
first circumscribe what may be referred to as the 'space' within 
which party and government intersect. We shall then look at the 
dimension or dimensions along which these relationships can be 
located. It will become possible to identify, third, a number of 




























































































valuable to make a number of methodological remarks about the way 
in which these matters can be tested empirically.
Party activities and governmental activities: the space of party- 
government relationships
Party-government relationships take place at a number of 
points which correspond to the different activities or 'functions' 
undertaken by governments, on the one hand, and by parties, on the 
other. Together, these points can be regarded as forming a
'space'; such a space is likely to vary somewhat from country to
country, given that the activities of governments and perhaps even 
more of parties are likely to vary. We need therefore to look at 
the activities of governments and the activities of parties to see 
where and in what ways these are likely to intersect.
For a period at least, the literature on coalition- 
formation concentrated on the relationship between parties and 
governments at one level, namely that of the allocation of 
portfolios among the various parties (3). The underlying 
assumption was that the way in which parties wanted to intervene 
in the governmental process was through the composition of the 
government: this approach was adopted in part because it was 
pointed out that parties wanted to achieve 'power' and that
membership of the government was the way to fulfil this aim; it
was also probably adopted because is obviously easier to quantify 




























































































of ministers of various parties are taken into account; there is 
moreover little doubt that participation in the government gives 
substantial opportunities for a party to have a say in public 
decision-making.
It came to be recognised, however, that a policy 
component had to be considered alongside the 'power' component: 
parties are not only interested in placing some of their members 
in the government: they have programmes which they wish to see 
carried out, in part at least (4). Indeed, such a policy component 
is necessary if one is to account for the part played by parties 
which support a minority government without being members of that 
government (5). Moreover, it has long been felt that the policy 
influence of parties was not necessarily exactly proportional to 
the size of these parties or even to the number of ministers which 
they have: a study relating to the influence of the FDP in the 
German government provides clear evidence in this direction (10 
Klingemann). Thus it seems that one needs at least two consider 
two different aspects of government-party relationships if the 
influence of parties is to be realistically assessed.
Yet there are two further elements in this relationship 
which need to be taken into account. The first concerns the 
demands may by parties for favours and patronage, especially 
because, in some countries at least, these play an important part. 
Admittedly, that part is difficult to measure with precision. 




























































































general ocntext of government-party relationships. On the one 
hand, they may be regarded as 'policies', more limited in 
character admittedly, but of the same kind as the national 
policies which parties put forward: indeed, at the borderline, 
some national policies put forward by a political party can also 
be regarded as 'bribes' designed to capture segments of the 
electorate. On the other hand, these favours are typically 
concerned with individuals or at most small districts and they 
are therefore of a different kind from what are usually regarded 
as party policies; as a matter of fact, they are conceived as 
different by the parties themselves, since they are often asked 
for in secret and at least have typically an 'unofficial' 
character. They should therefore be regarded as forming a separate 
category.
Indeed, for these reasons, the extent to which favours 
and patronage are regarded as acceptable or are at least tolerated 
varies markedly from country to country. Where they are viewed as 
interfering in an unwarranted manner with the 'proper' working of 
administrative bodies, they tend to be restricted and, at the 
limit, may only exist on a minute scale. Thus, while they are 
forms of relationships between governments and the parties 
supporting these governments (as well as sometimes even the 
parties in opposition), the extent to which they exist is likely 
to depend on the political culture of the country as much as and 





























































































Finally, these favours should not be considered only in 
themselves but also in relation to the need for governments to 
have some instruments with which to put pressure on parties. They 
are part of a large set of trade-off relationships in which 
governments are engaged. By giving favours to individual party 
members of a particular district, a government may ensure the 
continued support of the party members in that district: its 
proposals may therefore be more readily accepted. Admittedly, 
patronage is not the only mechanism by which trade-offs occur: for 
instance a party may be prepared to receive relatively few 
ministerial posts in exchange for policies which the government is 
prepared to implement. Indeed, trade-offs occur also at the level 
of the policies themselves, both among the parties and between the 
government and the parties which support this government. The set 
of exchange arrangements is thus extremely complex. Yet it seems 
that patronage and favours are a form of relationship between 
parties and governments which is both important and distinct from 
the relationships stemming from ministerial appopintments and from 
policy development. They must therefore be taken into account in a 
general analysis of these relationships.
Party-government relationships need to be made more 
general in another essential manner. So far, these relationships 
have been considered mainly from the angle of the possible 
influence and effect of parties on governments: such a standpoint 
is clearly one-sided. It is not only that parties may exercise 




























































































influence at all; it is that governments also attempt to influence 
and at the limit wish to control parties: indeed, some national 
leaders have created parties to strengthen their influence. Such a 
situation is not infrequent: it may be especially noticeable among 
parties which are relatively new and primarily among those which 
have been set up by national political leaders in office who want 
to increase their support among the population. This can easily be 
seen in the context of many Third World parties which are entirely 
controlled by the leader who created them; but it can also be 
observed to an extent in Western Europe among all the .parties 
which support a government, as these parties are likely to be 
regarded by national leaders and by ministers as instruments 
designed to help them in their political campaigns.
This governmental influence on parties can and does take 
place with respect to all three aspects which we examined earlier. 
It takes place at the level of favours, as we noted previously: 
the party may want to extract favours, but the government is (or 
is likely to be) the body which decides to distribute these 
favours in a 'strategic' manner, that is to say to those whom it 
feels are critical to win over or support. Governmental influence 
can and does also take place at the level of policies: ministers 
are very often likely to take strong steps to force the party to 
adopt certain items of policy which had so far given no or a very 
low priority; in some cases, national leaders and ministers are 
even forcing the party to change their standpoint and to support 




























































































influence can and does take place at the level of appointments: 
leaders and ministers thus often intervene in the selection of 
memnbers of the party hierarchy, both in the country and in the 
legislature, particularly at the top, though this pressure may 
also be exercised at regional or local levels.
We need therefore to think of the 'space' of the 
relationship between parties and governments as extending in terms 
of substance from national policy-making and the composition of
the government to the distribution of patronage in return for
popular support. while it can vary from dependence of the
government on the party. at one extreme , to dependence of the
party on the government, at the other. Given the complex character 
of these relationships, it is not surprising that they should vary 
sharply from country to country and, indeed, that the whole of the 
'space' should be not be occupied everywhere. We need to describe 
the dimensions along which party-government relationships can be 
located before examining, at least in a broad manner, the 
characteristics of some 'types' of party-government relations 
which appear to exist widely in the contemporary world.
Dimensions of government-party relationships
The structure of the problems posed by party-government 
relationships suggests that there must be dimensions along which 
these relationships take place: as a matter of fact, two 




























































































problem more closely, a number of difficulties emerge which cannot 
be satisfactorily overcome. So far at least, it seems that the 
questions posed can only be partly solved, though a partial 
solution already constitutes an advance in our understanding of 
government-party relationships.
The two dimensions which come to mind as soon as one 
considers the problem are those of autonomy v. interdependence, on 
the one hand, and of the direction of the dependence, on the 
other. The description of these dimensions in itself indicates 
some of the difficulties which will be encountered. For the 
question of the relationship between governments and the parties 
supporting them raises two main issues; but these issues are both 
distinct and interconnected.
On the one hand, this relationship varies according to 
the extent to which government and supporting party or parties are 
autonomous from each other. Indeed, one of the most important 
aspects of an inquiry into governments must be to identify the 
extent to which these governments can act as autonomous agents; 
but, if the governments are autonomous, the supporting parties are 
also autonomous. In practice, we are confronted here with a 
dimension, governments and parties being more or less autonomous 
or more or less dependent on each other: for instance, it is very 
likely that there will be areas of autonomy and that these will 
vary from country to country and from time to time. Thus it is 




























































































from parties with respect to foreign affairs than with respect to 
home affairs.
On the other hand, if there is a relationship of 
interdependence between governments and supporting parties, this 
relationship can vary markedly from one extreme of total 
dependence of the government on the party or parties supporting it 
to the other extreme of total dependence of the party or parties 
on the government, with an intermediate point corresponding to 
equal and reciprocal influence. We saw earlier that parties have 
often been set up with a view to helping governments and in 
particular leaders to maintain and even increase their hold on the 
nation; but the extent of dependence is likely to vary from 
country to country and indeed over time: we have therefore here 
also a dimension according to which we can measure (at least in 
theory) the relationship between government and suppporting party 
or parties in individual countries.
Thus it is sensible - indeed inevitable - that we should 
describe government-party relationships as being defined by the 
two dimensions of autonomy v. interdependence and of the direction 
of the dependence. Yet these two dimensions are manifestly 
interconnected: only to the extent that relationships are 
interdependent can one refer to the 'direction' of the dependence. 
If governments and supporting parties were fully autonomous from 
each other, there would be no direction of dependence, as there 




























































































that, in such a case, there would be perfect 'equality' between 
the two elements, an equality which would stem from the absence of 
any rapport. Of course, in the real world, there is no 'pure' case 
of this type: governments and supporting parties have always some 
rapport; the fact that the party 'supports' a government is 
already a form of rapport. As we indicated earlier, there will 
tend to be policy fields in which there is autonomy and policy 
fields in which there is interdependence. Thus one can truly refer 
to a two-dimensional space within which one can define the nature 
of government-party relationships in individual countries at 
various moments in time. Yet, in reality, too, because there 
cannot be a 'direction' of dependence if there is autonomy, 
countries will only be located in a part of the space which has 
just been defined, this part having the shape of a triangle in 
which one side is the 'direction of dependence' axis while the 
other two sides join each other at the autonomy end of the 
'autonomy-interdependence' dimension and at the middle point with 
respect to the 'direction of dependence' dimension. This is 
another way of saying that the two dimensions are in part 
interconnected as one is a condition of the other, but that, given 
the ambiguous character of real-world relationships between 
governments and supporting parties, these two dimensions have also 
to be regarded as distinct for many practical purposes (Diagram 
I )  •
The location of countries with respect to the two 




























































































governments and the supporting parties with respect to the three 
sets of activities which we described in the previous section. The 
part played by parties in the composition of governments and, 
conversely, the role of governments in the composition of the 
leadership group of the supporting parties are clearly essential 
elements both with respect to the 'autonomy-interdependence' 
dimension and with respect to the 'direction of dependence' 
dimension. Countries in which governments are appointed separately 
from parties and where governments do not interfere or interfere 
very little in the composition of the party leadership will tend 
to be located towards the 'autonomy' end of the 'autonomy- 
interdependence' dimension, at least with respect to attempts to 
exercise influence through the appointments of persons. Countries 
in which the party appoints the ministers but where the ministers 
do not affect the composition of the party leadership group are 
located towards the interdependence end of the 'autonomy- 
interdependence' dimension and towards the 'party dominant' end of 
the 'direction of dependence' dimension. Where the government has 
set up a party whose top leadership group it controls while the 
membership of the government remains independent from the party, 
the country is located also close to the interdependence end of 
the 'autonomy-interdependence' dimension, but towards the 
government-dominant end of the 'direction of dependence' 
dimension. Many countries are likely to be located at some 




























































































Yet, as was pointed out earlier, the appointments aspect 
of the problem is only one component; both the policy and the 
distribution of favours components have to be taken into account 
to locate countries in the space in a comprehensive manner. On 
both aspects, however, there are greater difficulties in coming to 
a satisfactory conclusion. While one can assess, indeed even 
measure (though, as we shall argue later, with some limitations) 
the extent to which the members of the government or of the 
leadership group of the supporting parties are interdependent or 
autonomous from each other, such a judgement is more difficult to 
pass with respect to policies and to the distribution of favours. 
With respect to policies, there are problems about the 
determination of the 'authorship', so to speak, that is to say 
about the determination of who originated and subsequently 
developed particular proposals; there are also problems arising 
out of the fact that answers may be markedly different in 
connection with the various substantive fields. We noted earlier 
that governments are perhaps more autonomous, in general, in the 
context of foreign affairs than in the context of home affairs; 
the distinction does not stop at this point. Further contrasts may 
occur within the home affairs fields: governments may thus be more 
autonomous in economic matters (or at least in most aspects of 
economics) than in social matters. Given these variations, a 
problem of 'weighting' arises before one can arrive at an overall 
assessment of the extent to which a given government is 
'autonomous', depends on the party or parties which support it or, 




























































































difficult to discover in a truly rigorous manner: one has 
therefore to be content with a less precise overall judgement of 
the position at which a given country should be located in the 
space with respect to policy elaboration and development.
The difficulties are even greater with respect to the 
determination of the location of countries in the context of the 
distribution of favours. This is in the first place because, as 
was already pointed out, a 'veil of ignorance' often exists in 
this respect: it is then not possible to know what position each 
country occupies in this respect and comparisons across countries 
become hazardous as a result; second, even when one can find out 
what favours are distributed, it is sometimes difficult to assess 
whether a given governmental decision has to be classified as a 
'favour' or is a 'normal' administrative decision; third, the 
problem of weighting is even more serious than with respect to 
policy-making, given the very large number of small advantages 
distributed by governments. Moreover, while favours which are 
handed out are evidence of the dependence of governments on 
parties, they are likely to be compensated for by other advantages 
received by the government, for instance in the form of electoral 
or other support. While a government which has to distribute many 
favours must therefore be regarded as being as a result dependent 
on the parties which support it, these parties may also be 
subsequently dependent on the government because of compensating 




























































































Indeed, as we suggested earlier, it is not always clear 
which body depends on the other in the context of the distribution 
of favours. The party members which count on these favours cannot 
easily 'afford' to break from the government if these are not 
immediately forthcoming. Moreover, as we also know, favours are 
also often distributed in order to obtain policy support. Thus the 
matter raises the general question of the determination of the 
overall position of a given country in the two-dimensional space. 
As it is not easy to achieve a satisfactory assessment of each 
country's position with respect to each of the components, and in 
particular of the policy-making and favours components, it is 
consequently unrealistic to expect to attain a truly precise 
result at the global level. Furthermore, these three components 
have also to be weighted: the basis for such a weighting is not 
altogether easy to discover.
One cannot therefore expect to achieve, and at any rate 
to achieve as yet a precise determination of the position of 
countries in the two-dimensional space which we have described 
here. Yet there is a further problem which arises from changes in 
the positions occupied over time by the different countries. This 
is especially likely to occur among countries in which the parties 
are not yet or alternatively are no longer 'consolidated'. One can 
in particular expect substantial movements over time in many Third 
World countries as well as, for the current period at least, in 
Central and Eastern European countries, though one is also likely 




























































































precisely the reason why an over time analysis is important: it a 
theory of government-party relationships is to be elaborated, we 
need to be able to assess in what direction or directions these 
relationships tend to move when the characteristics of parties 
change. This can be achieved only if one can monitor the changes 
in these relationships over time on the two-dimensional space 
which we have defined here.
The problem of the location of countries in this two- 
dimensional space thus appears difficult to solve, especially if 
one wishes to be precise in the determination of the positions of 
each country which is being analysed. If we are to proceed 
further, we need therefore to look at the concrete situation and 
the extent to which some general assessment can be obtained: if it 
becomes possible to locate countries, albeit in a rather rough 
manner, and if we are also able to monitor changes which take 
place over time, progress will have been made and the area of 
'party government' will cease to be what it is at present, namely 
a 'terra (almost completely) incognita'.
Broad patterns of party-government relationships
Ostensibly at least, a substantial number of countries 
seem to be characterised by a small number of types of government- 
party relationships. The best is therefore to start by examining 
these types in order to see whether they give rise in turn to 




























































































models. This method might also provide at least a partial solution 
to the problem of the analysis of changes over time, since, at 
least in many cases, these changes are relatively slow.
An impressionistic survey of government-party 
relationships suggests that, while positions at the three corners 
of the triangle are unlikely to be often occupied, positions near 
these three corners often are. To begin with, the top corner, 
which is characterised by the autonomy of governments with respect 
to parties (as well as, conversely, by the autonomy of parties 
with respect to governments) corresponds to a form of 'separation' 
between the two elements which is likely to exist when governments 
can emerge independently from parties. This situation is likely to 
be found when the executive has a source of legitimacy of its own, 
as in some monarchical systems where the government is of a 
'bureaucratic' type (for instance in 19th century Central Europe), 
and parties are also 'autonomous'; it occurs also where the 
executive has military support, but the parties have not been 
abolished (as was to an extent the case in Brazil under military 
rule); above all, it occurs in some presidential systems, if the 
'party' of the president is in effect sharply distinct from the 
'party' which nominally supports the president in the legislature: 
this case approximates that of the United States and, possibly, of 
some other presidential systems. In the American case, however, 
the large amount of favours which are distributed suggests that 
the autonomy of the government vis-a-vis the parties (and of the 




























































































The second rather extreme type of government-party 
relationships is that of the dependent party: cases of this kind 
are located towards the bottom corner of the triangle and close to 
the 'party-dependent' end of the 'direction of dependence' 
dimension. This type is that of governments which can rely on a 
docile supporting party. If the party is indeed entirely docile 
and does not contribute at all to the personnel of the government 
(as in some monarchies where ministers are drawn from the 
entourage of the King or from military men and civil servants), 
the country has then to be located at the extreme end of the 
'direction of dependence' dimension. This kind of situation can be 
found in a number of new countries, for instance in Black Africa, 
where the single party is often set up in order to help the leader 
to both mobilise and control the population. Over time, however, 
such a situation changes: in many cases, there will be some 
reciprocal influence as well as some role of the party in the 
composition of the government; indeed, the party may even play a
substantial part in providing a base for the selection of the
government members and at least be a sounding-board for
governmental policies, as has long been the case with the PRI in
Mexico. Moreover, there may be areas of complete autonomy of the 
government (as in particular in foreign affairs) and even of the 
party (occasionally on some issues, for instance on matters of 
conscience).
If one then moves a little from this extreme position, 




























































































case in point, as it moved gradually from the extreme of 
government dominance which characterised government-party 
relationships in that country in the late 18th century; but the 
move remained partial and indeed affected the parties to a 
different extent. The Conservative party may be regarded as still 
relatively close to the 'government-dominant' end of the 
dimension: to an extent as in Mexico, the party has a role in the 
determination of the group from which ministers are selected and 
indeed the (parliamentary) party has an effective role in the 
selection of the leader; on the other hand, the party is fully 
dependent on the government for the selection of its internal 
leadership group. There is thus 'fusion' of the leadership of the 
party and of the government, a fusion which benefits the 
government rather than the party. Meanwhile, the policy of the 
party is effectively decided by the leader and a small entourage, 
although the party may play some part, especially when it is in 
opposition. Finally, patronage is of limited significance. The 
Conservative party is thus at some distance, but not very far, 
from the 'government-dominant' corner of the triangle. It differs 
somewhat from the Labour party in this respect, as, in this case, 
there is more reciprocal influence, both in terms of the 
composition of the government and the party leadership and with 
respect to policy-making. Vet the difference is not very marked, 
as the governmental leadership of the Labour party always insisted 
on its right to implement and even to shape party policy and the 




























































































discontent but can rarely force alternative policies on the 
leadership.
The other bottom corner of the triangle has traditionally 
been occupied by Communist States, as the party leadership, rather 
than the governmental leadership, dictated policy and as the 
former appointed the latter (and indeed appointed, through the 
nomenklatura system, members of the public service well below the 
governmental level). This system was also a case of 'fusion', as 
is the case of systems where parties depend on the government, but 
the 'fusion' is exercised here to the benefit of the party rather 
than to the benefit of the government or, to use the Communist 
terminology, of the 'State apparatus'. A key element in this 
configuration is constituted by the high visibility of the party 
chiefs and the low (or at least lower) visibility of the 
government leaders: the fact that Gorbachev has endeavoured to set 
up a presidential type of arrangement is an indication that the 
previous system favoured markedly the party and that he proposes 
to reduce this role in the policy-making process as well as 
perhaps in the selection of the governmental personnel. The aim is 
to increase the autonomy of the government or to achieve 
reciprocal dependence between government and party, though this 
last point is less clear, given that the Communist party has lost 
prestige in the Soviet Onion, although not to the same extent as 




























































































Communist States were not the only group of countries in 
which a substantial dominance of the party over the government has 
existed for a long period. Another type is provided by many of 
those parliamentary systems which have typically coalition 
governments and in which both the selection of ministers and the 
determination of policies are markedly influenced by the 
government parties; moreover, in several of these countries, 
though not in all, substantial levels of patronage tend also to be 
found. These systems are not located as close to the corner of the 
triangle as Communist countries tended to be before the late 
1980s, admittedly; but they are not very distant from this corner. 
What makes the difference is some governmental autonomy and a 
degree of counterbalancing governmental influence; ministers are 
able to put some pressure on their party on policy matters; 
moreover, though they are rarely able to influence the composition 
of the top leadership organs of their party, there is often some 
leeway in governmental appointments, at least in some countries, 
as a result of the choice of persons coming from outside strict 
party ranks.
There are thus a number of relatively clear types of 
government-party relationships, as well as a number of discernible 
moves taking place over time. These moves seem to lead countries 
gradually towards positions away from the corners and inside the 
triangle. Truly central positions do not seem to be often 
occupied, however. As a result of the extent of consultation 




























































































social democratic governments seems to be the closest which can be 
found to a central position, though the country appears to occupy 
a half-way point on the 'direction of dependence1 dimension only 
and does remain close to the 'interdependence' end of the 
'autonomy-interdependence' dimension. Moreover, Sweden and perhaps 
occasionally other Scandinavian countries appear to be the only or 
at least the clearest examples of such 'middle' positions being 
taken.
'Central' positions in the triangle are perhaps not 
occupied because a choice has to be made, ultimately, between 
'autonomy' and 'interdependence', leaving some scope for manoeuvre 
only at the margin. The case of the Fifth French Republic appears 
interesting in this respect. It was set up on the basis of an 
ideology of governmental autonomy put forward by De Gaulle, 
against a background of party dominance over the government in the 
past: thus the aim was to achieve a balance between the two 
extremes. In practice, as the system came into being, a docile 
Gaullist party emerged almost immediately as a response to the 
need to strengthen governmental support: France thus moved to a 
position not unlike that of Britain under the Conservatives and 
indeed even originally somewhat closer to the 'government- 
dominant' corner of the triangle. Government-party relations 
subsequently moved somewhat from that corner: with the Socialists 
in power in the 1980s, the location of the French system appeared 




























































































governments, that is to say at some distance from the 'government- 
dominant* corner of the triangle, but also at a substantial 
distance from the mid-point of reciprocal influence which appears 
to characterise Swedish social democratic governments.
The types and moves which have been indicated here are 
based on impressions rather than firm evidence. They suggest that 
comparisons and contrasts can be made, however; they also suggest 
that the number of broad categorisations is probably relatively 
small: it seems therefore possible to look for what may be 
referred to as 'satellite' sub-types and to describe the moves 
taking place around each of the types. Yet we cannot proceed much 
further in such an inquiry unless we improve on 'impressions' and 
achieve a degree of firmness in the characterisations. Some 
mechanisms have therefore to be found in order to describe with a 
greater degree of precision the positions occupied by each country 
at given points in time. Can these mechanisms be found, given the 
difficulties which were mentioned earlier in the collection of the 
data and in the weighting to be given to these data if they are to 
provide a general description of government-party relationships?
What methodology can be used and how precise can it be
While recognising that a precise measurement of the 
manner in which governments and parties relate to each other is a 
very distant goal, one can identify already some means of going 




























































































empirical evidence. This is indeed essential if we do not merely 
wish to describe situations but attempt to account for government- 
party relationships, for instance by examining these in the light 
of the characteristics of the political system and in particular 
of the party system (6).
First, as was already suggested, the assessment of the 
nature of the relationships between government and supporting 
parties can be obtained with some degree of precision with respect 
to appointments. Data can be collected and, to an extent at least, 
this data is quantifiable. For this assessment to be comprehensive 
and thus to provide a realistic basis for the determination of 
government-party relationships, however, data about appointments 
must provide information about the way in which these are made and 
about who the decision-makers really are in this context: it is 
not sufficient to know that ministers are drawn, for instance, 
from the (parliamentary) party to conclude that the appointments 
are party-dependent: in the British case, especially in the 
Conservative party, the government leader has considerable leeway 
in selecting and indeed in dismissing ministers. There is 
government dependence on the party only if one can trace a 
significant influence of the party as such (of its executive or of 
the parliamentary party at large) in the selection process. 
Moreover, the party cannot be said either to exercise influence if 
ministers simply happen to be members of the party without having 
previously belonged to the leadership group or at least having 




























































































characteristics can be obtained, but it is not as readily 
quantifiable as is the number of ministers drawn from the party.
It is also somewhat difficult to be really precise about 
the influence taking place in the other direction. Information 
about the part played by the government in the appointment of 
members of the party leadership group may be less readily 
available, as ministers and national leaders may not wish to 
advertise widely their role in this respect. Yet this information 
is vital, as only if it is acquired can we discover the true 
nature of government-party relationships: it may be, for instance, 
that some apparent forms of dependence of the government on the 
party or parties supporting it are compensated by an influence in 
the other direction which is less apparent. We may have to correct 
the impression referred to in the previous section and according 
to which only in relatively few cases can one find a reciprocal 
and balanced form of dependence between government and supporting 
parties.
Thus this part of the analysis must achieve more than 
just present data on cabinet memberships. It must provide rather 
sophisticated information about the true nature of the 
relationships as far as appointments are concerned and thus 
establish a firm basis for at least one of the components of the 
inquiry, given that, as has already been stressed, the 
investigation of the other two components poses serious problems 




























































































Second, the assessment must none the less endeavour to 
find means of minimising difficulties with respect to the 
attribution of policy initiatives to governments and/or to 
supporting parties. In theory at least, the problem is not one of 
data collection, though obstacles exist at this level in practice, 
given the mass of decisions taken by governments: these obstacles 
may be partly overcome by selecting a limited number of important 
policy cases over a range of fields.
It is more difficult to discover means of obtaining a 
precise overall picture which can make intra- and intercountry 
comparisons truly revealing. To begin with, the real involvement 
of governments and parties may be blurred as the leaders of both 
types of bodies may have a political interest in giving the 
impression that they are jointly involved in the enterprise: there 
may therefore appear to be more reciprocal interdependence than is 
truly the case. Moreover, as at least important policies develop 
over a long period and as they often become markedly modified in 
the process, it may be theoretically difficult to decide who are 
the true 'authors': there would then seem to be genuine reciprocal 
influence.
As a matter of fact, however, some of these difficulties 
may be met by considering a series of cases, as similarities and 
differences may emerge from the sheer confrontation between cases 
both in each country and cross-nationally. One might thus be able 




























































































distinguish between types of interdependence by contrasting the 
various cases, although there will be limits to the extent to 
which a ranking will be obtained. In order to facilitate the 
process, a common cross-national framework of analysis of all the 
cases has to be devised. Cases must also be drawn from a wide 
range of policy fields, as one needs to assess whether differences 
in patterns of government-party relationships are truly systematic 
and are related primarily to the substance of these fields.
The most serious problem which the analysis of policy 
elaboration and development poses is thus the problem of 
'weighting', both among the policies and between the 'policy' 
component and the 'appointment' component of the analysis. It 
would be unrealistic to hope to find a truly satisfactory and 
elegant solution to these questions: it seems only possible to 
suggest arrangements designed to go beyond impressions but may not 
go as far as providing real rankings. It would be highly valuable 
to be able to give a score to each case which is studied on the 
basis of the nature of government-party relationships in this 
case: one could then add the scores to obtain an overall country 
picture. Such an undertaking may be unrealistic, however, largely 
because it may be difficult to elaborate a common scoring scheme 
for all the countries. One may therefore have to be content with 
the location of cases in a small number of categories such as 
those which were used in the previous section: even this result 




























































































these groups could be expected to be 'firm' and not to be based 
merely on 'impressions'.
Since government-party relationships occur both with 
respect to appointments and with respect to policy elaboration and 
development, the two components need to be considered in 
combination, especially in order to see whether they reinforce 
each other or, on the contrary, whether they pull in different 
directions. The question has indeed wide significance in terms of 
governmental structure as it relates to a general matter which was 
referred to earlier, namely whether parties (and, one should add, 
governments as well) concentrate on appointment mechanisms to 
achieve indirectly their policy aims or whether the two types of 
goals are pursued independently. One needs also to find out 
whether there are cross-national differences in this respect or 
whether the strategies of governments and parties tend to be the 
same.
The third component, that which relates to the 
distribution of favours and to patronage, is the most difficult to 
assess in terms of its true extent and importance, as we know. The 
best that can be hoped is that a survey, even if on a sample basis 
only, will reveal how much patronage there is and how large are 
the variations across countries. When this is achieved, one will 
need to relate these findings to the patterns which will have been 
discovered with respect to appointments and to policy-making, in 




























































































reinforces an otherwise large tendency for the government to be 
dominant or, on the contrary, whether patronage is used in order 
to compensate for relative governmental weaknesses or for a lack 
of interdependence between government and supporting parties. 
Impressionistic evidence from the United States and from some 
countries where coalitions governments are the norm suggests that 
patronage compensates rather than reinforces; but this conclusion 
may not be universal nor be really true even for the countries in 
which this conclusion appears valid on the surface.
We referred so far to countries: yet countries are not 
the true units of analysis. Government-party relationships are 
likely to vary both from party to party and over time: indeed, as 
was noted earlier, one of the main purposes of the analysis is to 
discover the extent of these over-time changes. From a 
methodological standpoint, however, the approach remains the same; 
the only complication arises from the fact that the data base has 
to be broader; for the analysis of policy development especially, 
a substantial increase in data collection has to be anticipated, 
since one will need to have a number of case-studies for each 
party and for each time period if conclusions are to be drawn: 
such an objective may be unattainable for practical reasons. A 
partial solution to the problem may be found by undertaking two 
types of case-studies: in only a small number would there be a 
truly detailed examination of all aspects of policy development, 
while these would be preceded by a survey of a substantially 
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arrangement would help to discover broad trends as well as to see 
which cases would be most profitably be analysed in detail, for 
instance because they are typical of a certain type of government- 
party relationships in a given party at a given point in time.
++++++++
Government-party relationships are complex and need 
therefore to be examined carefully. Yet they are difficult to 
study systematically, primarily because we do not have at our 
disposal instruments enabling us to make precise assessments and 
to undertake a comprehensive examination of large numbers of 
policies. The inquiry must begin, however, even if a first 
analysis can reveal only a part, perhaps even a small part, of the 
detailed relationships which exist between governments and the 
parties which sustain them. A first inquiry will open up the 
field. It will also do more, as it will provide much needed 
information about matters which can be regarded as going beyond 
the specific scope of the topic. To take two examples only. We 
have been apt to underestimate the role of governments in policy­
making: an inquiry into government-party relationships will help 
to discover the extent of this role. We know also that there is 
change in political systems, but the character and extent of this 
change is often not assessed, let alone measured: a study of 
government-party relationships will help to discover how much 




























































































At a time when many new regimes emerged while others modified 
their ideology and their structures, it is valuable to look 
concretely at the forms which these changes take, even if one does 
so at one point of political life only, especially if this point 
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